There's a section of the Philebus where Plato has Socrates argue that the intensest pleasures are all mixed with pain – that, in fact, it is this very mixture with pain which makes them so intense. He talks about scratching, which would never be a pleasure except that the itch which precedes it is so uncomfortable; but the combination (pain of itch + pleasure of scratch) excites us far beyond what any unmixed pleasure could ever do. (Incidentally, the translation I own clearly uses the words itch and scratch as if he were talking about mosquito bites; but the elaborately overwritten way he describes the pleasure of scratching is utterly incredible unless he is really talking about sex and means us all to get the point without him having to say so.) Besides scratching he also instances the pleasures of the theater, arguing that the enjoyment of drama – not only tragedy but even comedy – is a pleasure mixed with large quantities of pain, and that it is therefore more moving, more deranging, more maddening than any pure pleasure could ever possibly be.
His examples of pure pleasures include the pleasure of seeing clear geometric shapes, the pleasure of hearing pure tones, the pleasure of smelling delightful flowers, and so on. Note that pure tones make the cut as pure pleasures, but not all music does. I assume that Beethoven symphonies would be judged to contain a fair bit of pain (all that Sturm und Drang), thus explaining why listeners are so awed by them; and doubtless he would say the same thing about rock, but even more vehemently.
For the most part, the Buddha dharma agrees with this assessment exactly. The whole explanation for why anyone would want to follow the Buddha dharma is that it brings you pleasure and the avoidance of all suffering. When you look closely and realize that Buddhism offers you pleasure by asking you to give up (for example) sex and booze, the answer is that those things aren't really pleasures because they bring with them such a large quantity of suffering. Since the whole point of the Buddha dharma is to avoid suffering, that means avoiding those alleged "pleasures" which are really just suffering in disguise. Hence, for monks at least, no sex or booze, no ownership of stuff, and only one meager meal a day.
I've remarked before that Platonism and Buddhism seem to have a lot in common, and this teaching is certainly a prime example. What is interesting is that in both cases the emphasis, so far as I can tell, seems to be on proving that this and that pleasure contains a large component of pain (or suffering). It seems to be taken for granted that, once this point is understood, the result is obvious: if this or that intense pleasure derives its very intensity from containing a large quantity of pain, then it can't possibly be as good as it feels and any sane person will want to give it up.
Is it just me, or is there a step missing here? Couldn't someone argue just as logically that if the reason this or that pleasure (sex, say, or booze or the theater) feels so intense is that it contains a large admixture of pain, well then pain must not be as bad as we thought it was? Couldn't someone argue that if pain causes intense pleasure then pain is good and necessary? (Or at any rate that if certain kinds of pain, at certain times and under certain circumstances, cause intense pleasure – then those kinds of pain, at those times and under those circumstances, are good and necessary?) It sounds like a perverse conclusion when you put it that way, but I think it is just as logical as the other. If it's perverse, ... well, and is it somehow not perverse to argue that we should give up sex and wine and Beethoven because they are insufficiently pure? What? Or do we have a competition here between two conclusions that both sound pretty weird, but that both follow equally well from a surprising (but valid) analysis?
Let me go a step farther. It sounds perverse to say that pain is or can be good. But what about saying that you have to be willing to put up with short-term inconveniences (small pains) in order to get long-term goods (greater pleasures)? What about saying that it's better to do your homework even when you'd like to goof off (small pain) because you'll learn more that way and so become a success in life (greater pleasure)? Isn't that a platitude? Doesn't everybody believe that? Do Plato and the Buddha really disagree? Seen in that light, the "praise of pain" doesn't sound so weird after all.
So perhaps it's not quite so obvious which life to choose. Plato and the Buddha recommend a life of pure pleasures unmixed with pain and suffering. This ends up meaning a life of clarity and serenity, an abjuring of passion. But I think it is equally logical to accept the joys of passion, in full knowledge that there are miseries there as well – that, in fact, the very word passion means "suffering".
At any rate, if that conclusion is wrong then I think it takes a deeper argument to show it.
